TIIS (Çѱ¹ÀÎÅͳÝÁ¤º¸ÇÐȸ)
Current Result Document :
ÇѱÛÁ¦¸ñ(Korean Title) |
Dictionary Attacks against Password-Based Authenticated Three-Party Key Exchange Protocols |
¿µ¹®Á¦¸ñ(English Title) |
Dictionary Attacks against Password-Based Authenticated Three-Party Key Exchange Protocols |
ÀúÀÚ(Author) |
Junghyun Nam
Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo
Moonseong Kim
Juryon Paik
Dongho Won
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¿ø¹®¼ö·Ïó(Citation) |
VOL 07 NO. 12 PP. 3244 ~ 3260 (2013. 12) |
Çѱ۳»¿ë (Korean Abstract) |
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¿µ¹®³»¿ë (English Abstract) |
A three-party password-based authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocol allows two clients registered with a trusted server to generate a common cryptographic key from their individual passwords shared only with the server. A key requirement for three-party PAKE protocols is to prevent an adversary from mounting a dictionary attack. This requirement must be met even when the adversary is a malicious (registered) client who can set up normal protocol sessions with other clients. This work revisits three existing three-party PAKE protocols, namely, Guo et al.¡¯s (2008) protocol, Huang¡¯s (2009) protocol, and Lee and Hwang¡¯s (2010) protocol, and demonstrates that these protocols are not secure against offline and/or (undetectable) online dictionary attacks in the presence of a malicious client. The offline dictionary attack we present against Guo et al.¡¯s protocol also applies to other similar protocols including Lee and Hwang¡¯s protocol. We conclude with some suggestions on how to design a three-party PAKE protocol that is resistant against dictionary attacks
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Å°¿öµå(Keyword) |
Password-based authenticated key exchange (PAKE)
three-party key exchange
password security
offline dictionary attack
undetectable online dictionary attack
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